timately died. James Monroe, who received all but one of the electoral votes in his 1820 reelection campaign, presided over a so-called "Era of Good Feelings" (marred chiefly by portentous sectional conflict over the admission of Missouri) in which virtually everyone professed to be a Jeffersonian Republican.
The suppression of party labels, however, could not long conceal the existence of deep philosophical differences over the constitutional division of power between the states and the central governmentespecially as, particularly after Missouri, a certain breed of Southerner contrived to perceive a threat to slavery behind every exercise of federal authority. Virginia Representative John Randolph summed up this way of thinking in 1824: The government that could build highways could free the slaves. ' It was not long before political parties began to reemerge. Opponents of broad federal power initially flocked to Andrew Jackson, hero of the Battle of New Orleans. His election to the presidency in 1828 marked an epochal shift in federal-state relations. For the years between Jackson's inauguration in 1829 and the outbreak of civil war in 1861 would be dominated by his new Democratic Party, which claimed to speak for the Common Man. More realistically, perhaps, it spoke for free enterprise, for laissez faire, for states' rights, and increasingly, as witnessed by the eventual defection of a number of influential Northerners, for slavery. ' Opposition groups coalesced during the 1830s into the Whig Party, so called to highlight its antagonism to what its variegated adherents regarded as President Jackson's deplorable inclination to expand executive power. The dominant element of the Whig coalition revolved around such nationalistic leaders as Clay and Webster, who stood for a broad interpretation of federal powers to promote the economy. But there were other elements too, most notably the essentially states-rights Southern Whigs like John Tyler, who shared with his "consolidationist" fellows little more than a common antipathy to Andrew Jackson and his policies.
United States acquired additional territory from North Carolina," Georgia,n France,2 and Spain." 4 Thus over the years the United States became the proprietor of vast areas of land that came to be known as the public domain.
From the beginning it was contemplated that the territory thus acquired would eventually be admitted to statehood. The celebrated Northwest Ordinance, adopted by the Confederation Congress in 1787, expressly provided for division of the territory it covered into states, as Virginia had stipulated; 6 the treaties by which Louisiana and Florida were acquired prescribed prompt "incorporation" of the inhabitants into the United States. 6 Before 1829 eight new states had been established in what had once been territories: Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri.
Statehood put an end to federal sovereignty over the territories, but not to federal ownership of the lands. Statutes providing for the admission of new states not only reserved federal title to the public domain within their borders; they contained explicit provisions designed to insulate federal lands from state taxation. See Currie, The Federalist Period at 217-22 (cited in note 16); Currie, The Jeffersonians at 87-94,219-49 (cited in note 2). Kentucky, originally a part of Virginia, had been admitted, with that state's consent, without passing through territorial status. See also the peculiar case of Vermont, which likewise was never a territory. Both cases are considered in Currie, The Federalist Period at 97-101 (cited in note 16). 28 See, for example, the Louisiana Enabling Act § 3,2 Stat 641,642 (Feb 20,1811), as noted in Currie, The Jeffersonians at 223 (cited in note 2). For brief consideration of the persistent question whether this arrangement was consistent with the equal-footing principle that many nineteenth-century congressmen and the Supreme Court, in Coyle v Smith, 221 US 559, 566-68 (1911) , found implicit in Article IV, see Currie, The Jeffersonians at 294-95 (cited in note 2). See also President Martin Van Buren, First Annual Message (Dec 5,1837), in Richardson, ed, 3 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 373,384 (cited in note 10):
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From the beginning it was also contemplated that the federal government would make conveyances of public lands. Virginia's 1784 Deed of Cession for the Northwest Territory, for example, declared that the grant was made on the following condition, among others:
That all the lands within the territory so ceded to the United States, and not reserved for, or appropriated [for other purposes] ... , shall be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall become members of the confederation ... , according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever. 9 The Confederation Congress accordingly provided in 1785 that land in the ceded territory be surveyed and sold at auction for not less than $1 per acre,n and Article IV, § 3 of the new Constitution accordingly provided that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."
As I have related in earlier installments of this study, Congress made early and frequent use of its authority to dispose of the public lands. The First Congress made grants to Revolutionary veterans and to French settlers at Vincennes,' as the Virginia cession had envisioned. 32 The Fourth Congress reaffirmed the policy of the 1785 Ordinance, authorizing the Government to sell off individual parcels for not less than $2 per acre. 33 It also directed the transfer of a named tract to "the society of United Brethren for propagating the gospel among the heathen."-" When Ohio became a state in 1803, Congress granted it certain salt springs within its borders for public use, one section in each township "for the use of schools," and a percentage of the proceeds of federal land sales to build roads to and through the state." Subsequent statutes respecting the admission of other new states contained similar provisions.6 Later Congresses built upon this precedent to grant lands to subsidize additional roads and canals." In 1815 Congress authorized a grant of land for the relief of earthquake victims at New Madrid, in the Missouri Territory." In 1819 and in 1826 Congress made land grants to support "asylums" for the "deaf and dumb"-not in the territories but in the states of Connecticut and Kentucky. 9 Not all these dispositions were effected without constitutional controversy. Yet by the time Andrew Jackson became President in 1829 there was an impressive body of legislative precedent for a wide variety of dispositions of public land. Controversies over the constitutionality of other such dispositions pervaded the entire period from 1829 to 1861. II. THE 1833 DISTRIBUTION BILL In conformity with Virginia's specification that land in the ceded territories constitute "a common fund" for the benefit of all states, Congress in 1790 required that the proceeds of Western land sales be employed to pay off the national debt"-thus making land revenues in essence a substitute for federal taxes. By 1829, President Jackson was able to envision that the debt would soon be extinguished, 4 ' and it was not long before major debate erupted over what to do with the remaining public lands.
In his first Annual Message to Congress, in 1829, Jackson had already suggested that the anticipated tax surpluses be distributed among the states "according to their ratio of representation"after amending the Constitution, if necessary. ' Three years later, in his fourth Annual Message, he suggested a similar but subtly different disposition of the public domain.
Lands had been ceded to the United States, Jackson asserted, "for the purposes of general harmony and as a fund to meet the expenses of the [Revolutionary] war. 43 Those purposes "having been accomplished," he argued, it no longer made sense to regard the public lands as a source of revenue; they should rather "be sold to settlers ... at a price barely sufficient to reimburse" the government for its costs, and ultimately any remaining parcel should be "surrendered to the States respectively in which it lies.""
The following year, however, essentially on constitutional grounds, President Jackson vetoed a bill that would for a time have distributed the proceeds of public land sales to the states. 5 His first objection was that the distribution scheme was unequal. The bill would have given an initial 12.5 percent of the revenue from public land sales to those states in which the lands were situated. ' That, the President argued, was improper. Because the lands were to be held for the common benefit of the whole country, states in which public lands lay had no special claim. See id. Daniel Webster had made the same point the year before, in protesting what he perceived as the creeping heresy "that these lands, by right, belong to the States respectively in which they happen to lie": Jackson's reservations, however, went deeper. The bill directed that initial grants to the public-land states be applied "to objects of internal improvement and education" and the balance of revenues "to such purposes as the legislatures of the said respective States shall deem proper.' Thus the bill in both respects offended the principles Jackson had laid down in vetoing the bill for support of the Maysville Road:
The leading principle then asserted was that Congress possesses no constitutional power to appropriate any part of the moneys of the United States for objects of a local character within the States.... If the money of the United States can not be applied to local purposes through its own agents, as little can it be permitted to be thus expended through the agency of the State governments.' 9
Questions of consistency aside, 5 there was much to be said for Jackson's objections. The notion of equality in the distribution of public land benefits, to be sure, seems not to have risen to constitutional proportions. As Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin had argued in his notable 1808 report on internal improvements, pro rata distribution of federal tax revenues among the states made no sense, and nothing in the Constitution seemed to require it.' Tax revenues were to be spent where the general welfare demanded, not by mathematical adherence
The lands are well known to have been obtained by the United States, either by grants from individual States, or by treaties with foreign powers. In both cases, and in all cases, the grants and cessions were to the United States, for the interest of the whole Union; and the grants from individual States contain express limitations and conditions, binding up the whole property to the common use of all the States for ever. 49 Id at 65-66. Jackson also complained that the bill distributed the proceeds according to "Federal representative population" rather than "the general charge and expenditure provided by the compacts" of cession, id at 64, but this subtle distinction hardly seems of constitutional dimension in light of the general language of Article IV. In support of his interpretation Jackson invoked the concluding clause of that Article, which provides that "nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any claims of the to state lines 2 The history adumbrated above suggested that land revenues were meant to be an alternative to taxes, and they had long been so employed. In light of the absence of any explicit limitation on Congress's authority to "dispose of" the public domain, it is hard to find Congress more constrained in disbursing land revenues than in spending money raised by taxation.
But Jackson was on firmer ground in insisting that Congress was no less constrained when disbursing the proceeds of public lands. South Carolina Senator Robert Y Hayne had taken the same stance in opposing the distribution bill in 1832: If land proceeds were not subject to limitations on the disposition of tax revenues, there was no limit to congressional spending." Tennessee's veteran Senator Felix Grundy echoed Hayne's argument a few months later:
My proposition is ... that the lands belong to neither the new nor the old States, nor to both of them combined, but to the Federal Government; and that their proceeds cannot be applied to other objects than those to which the United States can constitutionally appropriate money." As Jackson would say in his veto message, Congress could spend tax moneys neither for education nor for local improvements, and therefore, Grundy concluded, it could not accomplish the same end indirectly by distributing land proceeds to the states. 55 . Calhoun also argued that Congress could not "denationalize" federal funds by distributing them pell-mell to the states. See id at 234 (Jan 25,1833). This argument is independent of the question whether President Monroe was right that Congress was authorized to spend for any subject of national import, or whether it could do so only when necessary and proper to the execution of other express or implied powers. See Currie, The Jeffersonians at 280-81 (cited in note 2).
57
See, for example, United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 72-73 (1936) (holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act payments to farmers to reduce production unconstitutional on this ground); South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203, 206-09 (1987) (holding that Congress may condition disbursement of federal highway funds to the states on adoption of a drinking age of twenty-one).
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Citing as precedent earlier land grants to support asylums for the deaf and dumb," nationalist leader Henry Clay insisted that Congress had unlimited authority to dispose of the public lands.'o Clay persuaded Congress but not the President, and Jackson had the last word. Clay and others stormed and fumed over Jackson's pocket veto, but they lacked both the competence to override it and the votes to try again;6 1 there was to be no general distribution of land proceeds to the states while a Democrat was President." . See also Register of Debates, 22d Cong, 2d Sess 129-36 (Jan 19, 1833) (Sen Poindexter); id at 161 (Jan 21,1833) (Ohio Sen Thomas Ewing); Register of Debates, 23d Cong, 1st Sess, Appendix at 205,207-09 (May 2, 1834) (Report of the Senate Committee on the Public Lands). Opponents of the 1833 distribution bill ignored these precedents; later advocates of limitations on the power to dispose of public property tended to dismiss them as aberrations. See, for example, notes 131-32 and accompanying text. Representative Clement Clay distinguished the more common grants made in connection with the admission of states on a ground later to become familiar: As others would say in defense of grants to construct railroads, these transfers were consistent with the trust imposed on Congress because they tended to enhance the value of other public lands. But see the 1836 "deposit" provision, discussed in Currie, Democrats and Whigs at ch 3 (cited in note 16), whose transparent purpose and effect were to transfer general funds of the Government to the states.
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Harrison, his biographer wrote, "was seldom the initiator of programs, and he was not conspicuous for advocacy of any particular political ideas .... Dorothy Burne Goebel, William Henry Harrison: A Political Biography 379-80 (Indiana Library 1926). He did receive a few kudos, however, for instigating a modest pro-settler reform of the public-land laws as Delegate from the Northwest Territory in 1800. See Robbins, Our Landed Heritage at 18 (cited in note 17).
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President Tyler, though grudging in his interpretation of Congress's power to appropriate tax revenues for internal improvements, 6 6 took a broad view of its authority to dispose of public lands. Finding that in the straitened financial circumstances that had prompted his predecessor to call the legislature into special session a number of states suffered from a crushing burden of debt, Tyler invited Congress to relieve them:
[A] distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, provided such distribution does not force upon Congress the necessity of imposing upon commerce heavier burthens than those contemplated by the act of 1833, would act as an efficient remedial measure by being brought directly in aid of the States. As one sincerely devoted to the task of preserving a just balance in our system of Government by the maintenance of the States in a condition the most free and respectable and in the full possession of all their power, I can no otherwise than feel desirous for their emancipation from the situation to which the pressure on their finances now subjects them. And while I must repudiate, as a measure founded in error and wanting constitutional sanction, the slightest approach to an assumption by this Government of the debts of the States, yet I can see in the distribution adverted to much to recommend it. The compacts between the proprietor States and this Government expressly guarantee to the States all the benefits which may arise from the sales. The mode by which this is to be effected addresses itself to the discretion of Congress as the trustee for the States, and its exercise after the most beneficial manner is restrained by nothing in the grants or in the Constitution so long as Congress shall consult that equality in the distribution which the compacts require. 
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John Tyler, Special Session Message (June 1, 1841), in Richardson, ed, 4 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 40, 47 (cited in note 10). Earlier, we are told, Whigs had advocated that Congress assume debts that the financially strapped states had incurred, largely to finance ambitious internal-improvement schemes that Jacksonian philosophy forbade Congress to subsidize directly. See Robbins, Our Landed Heritage at 78-79 (cited in note 17). By the time of Tyler's message they had largely abandoned assumption in favor of the indirect means of distributing federal largesse. See id. In the disillusionment that followed their initial enthusiasm, a number of states would soon adopt constitutional provisions severely restricting state and even local sup-
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No, Mr. Tyler was not gifted in his use of the written word. Paraphrasing is risky at best, but let me try. (1) The states were unable to pay their debts, and Congress ought to help them to the extent it could.
(2) Congress had no power to assume state obligations directly.
(3) To distribute the proceeds of land sales to the states would enable them to pay their debts and thus serve the same purpose as a forbidden assumption. (4) The federal government held the public domain for the benefit of the states, and to that end Congress could dispose of it however it liked, provided that the states were treated equally. (5) It was imperative, however, that tariffs not be increased beyond the levels agreed upon in the Compromise of 1833. (6) Congress ought therefore to think seriously about distributing land revenues to the states, but only so long as the money was not needed to meet federal expenses. Tyler's conception of Congress's power to dispose of the public lands was as capacious as that of Henry Clay.
Legislative debate was brief and offered little that was new."
Congress took Tyler's advice, and he signed the resulting bill. 69 Following the pattern of the bill Jackson had vetoed in 1833, the 1841 statute granted an initial percentage of land proceeds to western states in which the land was sold.'0 This time, however, there was no restriction on how these funds should be used. 7 ' After deducting administrative expenses, the remaining revenue was to be divided among the states, the territories, and the District of Columbia "according to their respective federal representative population" and "applied by the Legislatures of the said states to such purposes as the said Legislatures port for internal improvements. See Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 59,71-72,80,138-39, 145-49 (Columbia 1960).
68 Nathan Clifford of Maine in the House, Silas Wright, Jr. of New York, and Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire in the Senate repeated that the source of funds was irrelevant; Congress could spend land proceeds only for those purposes for which it could spend tax money. See Cong Globe, 27th Cong, 1st Sess 128 (June 29, 1841) (Blair and Rives 1833-1873) (Rep Clifford); id at 325-26 (Aug 20, 1841) (Sen Wright); Cong Globe, 27th Cong, 1st Sess, Appendix at 247 (Aug 25, 1841) (Sen Woodbury). Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton added that land revenues distributed to the states would have to be replaced by taxation; he seemed to be suggesting that Congress was indirectly financing local projects with tax money. Id at 228 (Aug 13, 1841). Most interesting was Calhoun's observation that many of the public lands had been purchased with tax revenues to begin with: "By what art, what political alchymy, could the mere passage of the money through the lands free it from the constitutional shackles to which it was previously subject?" Id at 333 (Aug 24, 1841). Supporters of distribution had the votes and largely held their tongues; Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts, in the House, echoed Tyler's argument that Congress could dispose of land for whatever purpose it wished. Id at xi (July 2, 1841). 
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See id at 453-54, § 2. A later section granted the same states additional lands "for purposes of internal improvement," which the following section defined as "[r]oads, railways, bridges, canals and improvement of water-courses, and draining of swamps." Id at 455, § § 8, 9.
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The University of Chicago Law Review may direct." 72 These provisions were wholly inconsistent with President Jackson's veto message, but the Democrats had lost both Congress and the presidency. 73 The distribution act was to be permanent, 7 but its operation was to be suspended if a foreign war broke out 75 or if customs duties were raised beyond the levels provided for in the Compromise of 1833. 76 The expenses of war might create a need for land revenues, and Tyler had made it a condition of distribution that it be accomplished without imposing additional duties." Tariffs had to be raised in 1842 to cover government expenses, and distribution was accordingly sus-71 pended. The Mexican War, which would have suspended distribution in any case, "buried it under a national debt sufficiently heavy to keep it down for many years." 79 In 1848, after the war was over, President Polk spoke of distribution in the past tense and branded it an uncon-72 Id at 453, § 2. Section 4, id at 454, required that such grants be first applied to the payment of debts owing to the United States, but that did not remove the constitutional objection. As opponents argued, Congress had no general authority to pay state debts. See Thomas Hart Benton, 2 Thirty Years' View; or, A History of the Working of theAmerican Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 241 (Appleton 1854) ("There was no prohibition upon the payment of the State debts: that was a departure from the objects of the Union too gross to require prohibition."). See also the discussion of the 1790 assumption of state revolutionary debts in Currie, The Federalist Period at 76-78 (cited in note 16). I did not think that I could stand excused, much less justified, before the people of the United States, nor could I reconcile it to myself to recommend the imposition of additional taxes upon them without at the same time urging the employment of all the legitimate means of the Government toward satisfying its wants.
Id at 185. To give away land revenues for state purposes at a time when the federal Government needed them to meet current expenses, he added, was "highly impolitic, if not unconstitutional." Id at 187. For the story of these vetoes, see Stephenson, Political History of the Public Lands at 73-87 (cited in note 17).
78
See5 Stat 548,567, § 30 (Aug 30,1842).
79
Stephenson, Political History of the Public Lands at 90 (cited in note 17).
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The Constitution in Congress stitutional element of the discredited American System.M Although the statute was not repealed, distribution was apparently never resumed. 8
IV. THE IRON HORSE
President Polk had no difficulty, however, in approving the usual land grants to the new states of Florida, Iowa, and Wisconsin for such apparently local purposes as state government, transportation, and schools.8 Two days before leaving office, in March 1849, he signed a bill granting Louisiana most "swamp and overflowed lands ... unfit for cultivation" within its borders, in order "to aid the State ... in constructing the necessary levees and drains to reclaim" them.' Whig President Millard Fillmore did the same for other states in 1850. On the same day he signed the second swamp bill Fillmore also endorsed the grant of 40 to 160 acres to veterans of the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and various Indian wars, and to their immediate survivors.
How some of the grants Polk approved could be reconciled with standard Democratic theory as spelled out in Jackson's veto of the 1833 distribution bill would take a bit of explaining. The debates on yet another disposition from the time may prove informative in this regard, for 1850 was also the year in which President Fillmore approved a massive land grant to support construction of the Illinois Central Railroad.-
The rise of the railroad had prompted many Democrats in Congress, especially those from the West, to reexamine their party's traditional hostility to federally subsidized improvements. As early as 1830 80 
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The University of Chicago Law Review Hayne to Daniel Webster (Jan 15,1830), in Wiltse and Allen, eds, 3 The Papers of Daniel Webster at 9, 9 (stating his conviction that the petition was "at variance, with the principles for which the State of South Carolina was contending, in relation to the powers of the federal government"). See also Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun 172 (Oxford 1987) (explaining that Webster presented the petition at the request of Sen Hayne).
88 Railroads were given, however, "either full or partial rebates on the duties on iron imported for rails"; and four railroads "received free right of way through federal lands and the use of stone and timber from them." See Goodrich, American Canals and Railroads at 169-70 (cited in note 67 sections in width on each side of said road . ,,9' Similar provisions were made for Alabama and Mississippi in order to subsidize extension of the road from the Ohio to Mobile, on the Gulf Coast.9
When Senator Douglas introduced the bill in April 1850, Georgia Whig William Dawson objected. The United States held the public lands in trust, said Dawson, either "for the people at large or for the States"; it had no right to donate any part of the trust property "to any portion of the cestui que trusts to the exclusion of the other." 9 3
William Seward, Whig Senator from New York, disputed Dawson's premise. Congress had express authority to dispose of public lands, " "without any limitations prescribed upon our discretion." 9 5 The Constitution imposed no specific trust; there was no need to distribute lands or their proceeds equally among all citizens. Congress should exercise its power, "like every other power of the Government,... with judgment, wisdom, and a due regard to the best interests of the country." ' It was in the country's best interest to dispose of land for the construction of railroads that would promote settlement and cultivation of the public domain. 9 7 Douglas, in contrast, conceded Dawson's premise that public lands were held in trust for the entire nation, but he disputed Dawson's conclusion. Like any trustee, he argued, Congress might lawfully dispose of public lands in any manner that increased the value of the trust fund; and by granting land to promote railroads the Government enhanced the value of the remaining soil." "[B]y running this road 98 See id at 849. To ensure that the Government be none the poorer for having parted with some of its acreage, the Act required that alternate sections not granted to the states "shall not be sold for less than double the minimum price of the public lands." 9 Stat at 466, § 3. See also Cong Globe, 31st Cong, 1st Sess 845 (Apr 29, 1850) (Illinois Sen Stephen Douglas). "This arrangement," Illinois Representative John McClernand had said almost two years earlier in debating a similar bill, "will secure to the Government as much for one-half of the land as it otherwise could obtain for the whole." Cong Globe, 30th Cong, 1st Sess, Appendix at 1137 (Aug 12, 1848).
The University of Chicago Law Review [70:783 through [the Pine Barrens] of Mississippi and Alabama," explained the venerable Henry Clay, "you will ... bring into market an immense amount of lands, increasing their value to the benefit of the treasury of the United States.!"
Dawson had begun the debate by observing that he could perceive no distinction between granting land to subsidize a railroad and appropriating money for the same purpose."' As South Carolina Senator Andrew Butler noted, the Democratic Party was on record as denying (in its Baltimore Platform of 1844) that Congress had power to establish a general system of internal improvements;.' if Congress could evade this limitation by simply granting land instead of money, said Dawson, "all controversy about internal improvements will have ceased....,"' Alabama Democrat William R. King, whose state was to benefit from Douglas's bill pursuant to an amendment he himself had offered,' 03 thought there was a difference:
As regards our constitutional power on this subject, we have always drawn a distinction between appropriations out of the Treasury direct, and the right of the Government to dispose of the public domain for the internal improvements of the States, so that the part not so disposed of will be increased in value, or as a great land owner would dispose of part of his own lands for the benefit of the remainder. ' 
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The same distinction, King added, had been explicitly embraced two years before by that latter-day high priest of states' rights, the late John C. Calhoun."'
Other good Democrats bought the distinction as well. Lewis Cass, the party's 1848 presidential candidate, stated it concisely that year in the Senate.'i President Franklin Pierce would soon swallow it hook, line, and sinker.'° Nor was congressional Democratic support for land grants for railroads confined to members from the North. As we have seen, King of Alabama supported the Illinois Central bill; so did both Jefferson Davis and Henry Foote of Mississippi, through whose state the road would also run.' The principal division on this question was between East and West, not between North and South."
Mississippi and Alabama spokesmen were thus prepared to help themselves to federal land, but they drew the line at helping Kentucky and Tennessee. To reach the Gulf Coast, and thus to provide adequate access to the benefited lands, the road had to cross those states as well, but both were devoid of unappropriated federal land.° Tennessee Senator John Bell, a respected Whig who would run for President on the Constitutional Union ticket in 1860, accordingly proposed to grant both Tennessee and Kentucky proceeds from the sale of land in Alabama, Mississippi, and Illinois."' King protested at once: To give land to states other than that in which it was situated was a different matter entirely."' Jefferson Davis agreed: Congress could grant land "to build a road through its unsettled domain, with a view of bringing it into the 
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[70:783 market, or rendering it saleable. ' ". 3 To do so in order to build roads elsewhere, he argued, was a "new feature" that could not be condoned, for he was unable to perceive "any difference between thus granting land or taking money from the treasury to build these works"and that, of course, conventional Democratic interpretation forbade."'
The rift thus opened was detrimental to the cause of internal improvements, since it meant that Congress could subsidize them only in Florida and the West, where there were abundant federal lands." 5 As Bell suggested, the distinction was also without constitutional foundation. " ' For the argument in favor of grants to Illinois was that they would enhance the value of property still owned by the United States; grants to Kentucky and Tennessee were equally important to improving the value of Illinois land. Indeed Davis was right that there was no way of distinguishing grants of money for this purpose from grants of land: Any federal subsidy that promoted the Illinois railway was necessary and proper to improving the marketability of Illinois public land.
It was not long before Congress granted public lands for additional railroads in Iowa, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan-all states embracing goodly quantities of federal land. ' President Pierce signed them all." ' He also reiterated his predecessors' request for aid in the construction of a railroad to the Pacific coast, "by all constitutional means."".. 9 Sectional jealousies over choice of the 113 Id at 870. 114 Id. For the defeat of Bell's amendment, see id at 900 (May 2, 1850). 115 Even if the Constitution did not (as Senator Hopkins Turney of Tennessee argued) require that all states benefit proportionally from the disposition of public lands, there was certainly something to his policy argument that the benefits should not accrue exclusively to those states in which the land was situated. See id at 871-72 (Apr 30,1850 118 He did so even though earlier doubts whether (constitutional questions to one side) the country was going "too fast and too far" in this direction had led him to reopen for public sale more that 30,000,000 acres that had been reserved in anticipation of future grants. route postponed authorization until the Civil War,° but the railroad grants had already broken new ground in the disposition of public lands.
V. THE MAD Even as they endorsed the railroad precedents, however, Democratic Presidents Pierce and Buchanan would wield the veto with vigor over the decade following the Illinois Central grant to enforce their otherwise narrow views of Congress's constitutional authority to dispose of the public domain.
The first of these vetoes came in 1854, when Congress in a moment of weakness was persuaded to grant land to the states to support asylums for the indigent insane. Various bills to this effect had passed one or the other House, and in one case both Houses, in 1851, 1852, and 1853.121 Proponents predictably pointed out that Congress had already granted land for an enormous variety of purposes; opponents predictably argued that the precedents were either erroneous or not in point." These arguments were repeated at greater length in the Senate debate on the bill that passed both Houses in 1854.' President Pierce's veto message neatly encapsulated the arguments against the bill.' 2 4 If Congress could provide for the indigent insane, it could provide for "all those among the people of the United States who by any form of calamity become fit objects of public philanthropy"-whether victims of idiocy, destitution, or disease.' 2 2 I readily and, I trust, feelingly acknowledge the duty incumbent on us all as men and citizens, and as among the highest and holiest of our duties, to provide for those who, in the mysterious or-der of Providence, are subject to want and to disease of body or mind; but I can not find any authority in the Constitution for making the Federal Government the great almoner of public charity throughout the United States."
The general welfare clause, Pierce safely concluded, was a limitation on the tax power, not a grant of authority to do whatever was good for the United States."' A bill to spend money from the Treasury to support the indigent insane "would have attracted forcibly the attention of Congress"'-in other words, no one would have thought it constitutional. That was enough, he thought, to dispatch the bill that Congress had passed; for from "a constitutional point of view" it was "wholly immaterial whether the appropriation be in money or in land.' 29 As the Virginia act of cession had expressly provided, the public lands were to constitute "a common fund" for all of the United States and to be disposed of for that sole purpose-not, said Pierce, to achieve "objects which have not been intrusted to the Federal Government, and therefore belong exclusively to the States. ' Finally, wrote Pierce, the only precedents in point were grants made in 1819 and 1826 to subsidize asylums for the "deaf and dumb," and those grants should never have been made. 3 ' For those institutions were of no more national significance than "any establishment of religious or moral instruction," or for that matter "every ear of corn or boll of cotton," or anything else that "promotes the material or intellectual well-being of the race."' ' 2 Pierce did not mention the general distribution law Tyler had approved in 1841; he obviously shared Polk's view that it had been unconstitutional too. " ' Other land grants, Pierce concluded, could easily be distinguished. The public land, he asserted, is distinguished from actual money chiefly in this respect, that its profitable management sometimes requires that portions of it be appropriated to local objects in the States wherein it may happen to lie, as would be done by any prudent proprietor to enhance the sale value of his private domain. All such grants of land are in [70:783
The Constitution in Congress fact a disposal of it for value received, but they afford no precedent or constitutional reason for giving away the public lands.'
Thus the various grants to new states were not only consideration for preserving federal rights (including tax immunity) in the remaining public lands but also "a way to augment the value of the residue and in this mode to encourage the early occupation of it by the industrious and intelligent pioneer."' Thus the grant of swamp lands for draining It is strange, when we have heard, time and again here, that these lands are held by the General Government as the trustee for the States; when we have been told so often, in very glowing terms, 134 Pierce, Veto Message (May 3,1854) at 253-54 (cited in note 107). 135 Id at 254. Grants to military veterans, Mississippi Senator Stephen Adams twice explained, were not gratuities either; they were additional compensation for services rendered, and thus, he seemed rightly to imply, necessary and proper to the raising of armies and the conduct of war. See Cong Globe, 33d Cong, 1st Sess 570-71 (Mar 8, 1854) . 136 Pierce, Veto Message (May 3,1854 
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that they have been procured by shedding the common blood, or they have been purchased by applying the common treasure; that we are then also told that it is utterly unconstitutional in the trustee to use a portion of the lands which he holds for the benefit of those for whom he holds them."O Indeed, added Senator Isaac Walker of Wisconsin, if the public lands were "the patrimony of all the States," as opponents of the bill argued, grants for insane asylums everywhere were far less objectionable than the various grants to individual states that Congress had routinely approved; for the present bill was, he believed, "the first bill ... which has ever been before Congress proposing to make an equi- Carolina, it is because the interest or common benefit of the Confederated Government required it.'' Forts, for example, must be built where an enemy might otherwise invade the country:
Because the city of New York draws largely upon the public resources for its defenses, it would be a strange pretension that Frankfort, in Kentucky, must be equally fortified, or that there must be a naval dock-yard in Iowa, because there is one in Virginia. Such a demand, if acceded to, would hazard the benefit of all, by the pretense of seeking the benefit of each.' 43 Badger's argument that Congress was trustee for the states and could therefore distribute the land to them was more troublesome, for the famous Virginia cession designated the ceded lands as a fund for "such of the United States as have become, or shall become members of the confederation"'"-and thus arguably for each of the states rather than for the Confederation. 4 But Cass had an answer for that too, and it was a good one. When the cession was made, he explained, the United States had no taxing power; the Federal Government was dependent upon contributions from the several states.'" To end this 140 [70:783 dependency was one of the reasons for the adoption of the new Constitution; it was also one of the purposes of the cession. Now, what is the meaning of the terms employed in it, that the land should become a fund for the use and common benefit of the members of the Confederation, according to their usual proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and should be faithfully applied to that purpose, and to no other? That this fund should go towards defraying the expenses of the Confederation, and should be fairly appropriated to that purpose...."' Thus the cession was "designed ... for the benefit of the Confederation as such," not to make the United States a conduit for distributing wealth to the individual states." On this interpretation the bill to finance asylums for the insane was an easy case; grants for this purpose were not necessary and proper to the exercise of any federal powers, not even to management of the public lands. The harder case of a homestead law was soon to reach the desk of Pierce's successor. In the meantime, however, President James Buchanan would have yet another opportunity to express his views on the purposes for which Congress might legitimately dispose of the public domain.
VI. THE LEARNED
On December 14, 1857 Representative Justin S. Morrill, Republican of Vermont, introduced a bill to distribute public lands to each of the states for the purpose of establishing colleges whose "leading object shall be ... to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts.' ' . 9 Congress's power to dispose of public lands, Morrill argued, was plenary; Congress had made grants for a variety of purposes, including education."' If Congress could make educational grants to individual states, it could make them to all states at once; and it was time for Congress to do something to promote agriculture as well.' 147 Id. 148 Id.
149 See Cong Globe, 35th Cong, 1st Sess 32 (Dec 14,1857). The bill itself is printed, with minor modifications, in id at 1697 (Apr 22,1858); the quoted language is taken from § 4. Under § 2 of the bill, states in which there were no federal lands were to be given their proportional share in the form of "land scrip" to be redeemed by private purchasers from lands in any other state. See id.
150 See id at 1696 (Apr 20,1858). 151 See id (arguing that his measure was "but an extension of the same principle over a wider field").
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Opponents made the usual objections in both the House and the Senate."' Ohio's Democratic Senator George Pugh pointed out with much justice that there was no way to distinguish the present bill from the one President Pierce had just vetoed, for agriculture was no more a federal subject than was the care of the indigent insane. 153 Pugh made an additional objection that had not been heard before in the context of federal grants. The bill attached a variety of conditions to the grants it authorized: The states were to establish colleges to teach agriculture and the mechanical arts; the corpus of the land proceeds was to be preserved as an endowment for those institutions; the interest was to be expended for their support, but not for the construction of buildings; and so on. Now, sir, if we have the right to require the things which are specified in this section, if they are incident to, or a part of any of the powers possessed by Congress, let us do it directly by legislation; but the section proceeds upon the hypothesis, upon the admission, that these ... are things which Congress has no right to require, except as conditions to a gift; and in order to acquire that authority, in order to usurp that power from the State Legislatures, we propose to bribe them, by the donation of public lands-bribe them to surrender powers which they did not surrender at the time the Constitution was established.! " Virginia Democrat James Mason echoed Pugh's concern: The states were to be "bribed by Federal power to conform their domestic policy to Federal will.' 1 56 This was a different argument from that which Pierce had made against the asylum bill and Pugh and others had repeated above. Pugh made the distinction plain in later moving to eliminate the conditions from the bill:
If you choose to grant public lands to the States in aid of agriculture and for the establishment of colleges, as the first and second sections of the bill provide, do so; but leave it to the wisdom of the States how to apply it, and not undertake to fetter them by conditions imposed in this bill. In fact, objectionable as the whole grant is to my mind, this attempt of Congress to assume control over the legislation of the States, in virtue of the condition, is altogether the worst feature of the bill ....
Even if
Congress had power to grant lands for educational purposes, Pugh was saying, it had no right to condition the grant on state action that Congress could not require. This was the argument that would later be made in such conditional-grant cases as United States v Butler' 8 and South Dakota v Dole. 9 It had been made in Congress in connection with conditions attached to federal employment and to naturalization.'6' It had prevailed there in the context of Missouri's admission to the Union. 1 It was the now-familiar argument of unconstitutional conditions.
It was not to prevail in Congress in 1858 or 1859. Each House approved the land-grant college bill, '62 and President Buchanan killed it on the basis of the argument his predecessor had employed in rejecting grants for insane asylums: Neither agriculture nor education was an appropriate object of federal bounty.' 63 Buchanan's veto message is a major pronouncement on Congress's power to dispose of the public lands and deserves to be more widely read.
It was clear, Buchanan wrote, that Congress could not appropriate tax revenues to establish colleges; Congress could tax only for federal, not state purposes.4 The public lands, he continued, were subject to the same restriction: 157 Id at 785 (Feb 4,1859). 158 297 US 1, 74 (1936) ("Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance."). 164 Id at 547 ("I presume the general proposition is undeniable that Congress does not possess the power to appropriate money in the Treasury ... for the purpose of educating the people of the respective States.").
It would require clear and strong evidence to induce the belief that the framers of the Constitution, after having limited the powers of Congress to certain precise and specific objects, intended by employing the words "dispose of" to give that body unlimited power over the vast public domain. It would be a strange anomaly, indeed, to have created two funds-the one by taxation, confined to the execution of the enumerated powers delegated to Congress, and the other from the public lands, applicable to all subjects, foreign and domestic, which Congress might designate; that this fund should be "disposed of," not to pay the debts of the United States, nor "to raise and support armies," nor "to provide and maintain a navy," nor to accomplish any one of the other great objects enumerated in the Constitution, but be diverted from them to pay the debts of the States, to educate their people, and to carry into effect any other measure of their domestic policy.... The natural intendment would be that as the Constitution confined Congress to well-defined specific powers, the funds placed at their command, whether in land or money, should be appropriated to the performance of the duties corresponding with these powers. The question is still clearer in regard to the public lands in the States and Territories within the Louisiana and Florida purchases. These lands were paid for out of the public Treasury from money raised by taxation. Now if Congress had no power to appropriate the money with which these lands were purchased, is it not clear that the power over the lands is equally limited? The mere conversion of this money into land could not confer upon Congress new power over the disposition of land which they had not possessed over money.... The inference is irresistible that this land partakes of the very same character with the money paid for it, and can be devoted to no objects different from those to which the money could have been devoted. 6 Earlier land grants for educational purposes were distinguished as Pierce had distinguished them five years before: Made "chiefly, if not exclusively,.., to the new States as they successively entered the Union," these grants had made nearby retained lands more valuable by enhancing their attractiveness to potential settlers.'6 Finally, Buchanan concluded, No person will contend that donations of land to all the States of the Union for the erection of colleges within the limits of each 165 Id at 548-49. 166 See id at 549-50.
[70:783 can be embraced by this principle. It can not be pretended that an agricultural college in New York or Virginia would aid the settlement or facilitate the sale of public lands in Minnesota or California.' 67 And so Representative Morrill's noble plan to educate farmers and mechanics, like the earlier effort to care for the indigent insane, foundered on sound Democratic conceptions of the boundaries of federal power. The land-grant colleges that were to bear Morrill's name were not to be authorized until 1862, when the presidency was in other and more sympathetic hands. ' 6
VII. THE FOOTLOOSE
Our survey of public-land controversies during the pre-Civil War period comes to an end with President Buchanan's veto of a homestead bill passed by both Houses in 1860."
Homestead bills had been percolating in Congress at least since 1835. The 1841 distribution law had given actual settlers a "preemptive" right to buy public lands at the minimum statutory price of $1.25 an acre. 0 The homestead proposals went further, commonly offering the land scot-free (or on payment of administrative costs) to any citizen who would settle on the land and cultivate it for five years.'' The purpose was to encourage settlement of underpopulated 172 areas.
167 Id at 550. Congress had granted land to Wisconsin "for the use and support of a university" in 1838, 5 Stat 244 (June 12, 1838), but the precedent was not on point. In the first place, Wisconsin encompassed additional public lands whose value might be enhanced by the existence of an institution of higher learning. Furthermore, the grant was made while Wisconsin was a territory, over which only Congress had legislative power. 168 (visited May 15,2003) . 172 In the later years of this struggle the vote on these proposals was almost perfectly divided on sectional lines. Southerners had discovered, it is said, that "free land meant free soil." Robbins, Our Landed Heritage at 109, 179 (cited in note 17). A Canadian newspaper neatly summed up the reason: "The most effective way to shut out slavery is to people the new lands... with men whose position places them in natural antagonism to the plantation system." See id at Opponents attacked the homestead bills on grounds familiar to those who have followed what happened to land grants for agricultural colleges and care of the insane. To President Buchanan those precedents were squarely in point. In his veto of the Morrill bill he had made clear that to "dispose of" the public lands meant to sell them, not to give them away; in the case of homesteads, the nominal consideration of twenty-five cents per acre (to be paid at the end of five years) was "so small that [the transaction] can scarcely be called a sale.'. 3 Beyond that, Buchanan had nothing new to say on the constitutional question; he contented himself with quoting the meaty parts of his veto message of the year before.' 7 4
But the homestead bill was not, as Buchanan imagined, a carbon copy of the ill-fated bills to finance insane asylums and agricultural schools. It differed in one critical respect, as repeatedly emphasized by its most irrepressible advocate, Representative (and then Senator) Andrew Johnson of Tennessee.'
Johnson, the reader knows, would later bear the dubious distinction of being the first President ever impeached. A staunch Unionist who would remain at his congressional post after his state had attempted to secede, he would incur the wrath of congressional radicals by opposing on powerful constitutional grounds their efforts to abolish civilian government in ten southern states. When we first encounter him in the 1840s, Johnson was a green populist legislator with a penchant for demagoguery. 1 6 But his homestead project was a worthy one, and he defended it with admirable tenacity and skill. 209 principal credit for the progress of homestead legislation to Johnson, "for having had the head to conceive, and the energy and perseverance to consummate, so important and philanthropic a measure").
176 Johnson's first major speech in the House, in 1844, was a tasteless defense of slavery replete with biblical citations and racial slurs. In 1846 he proposed that no federal officer be permitted to serve longer than eight years and that appointments be apportioned among the states according to population. Later the same year, attempting to tar the Whig Party with the discreditable Hartford Convention, he impugned the loyalty of those who questioned the legitimacy of the Mexican War. In 1851 and again in 1852 he proposed a constitutional amendment to limit federal judges to twelve-year terms. See Cong Globe, 28th The best congressional debate on the constitutionality of homestead legislation took place in the House of Representatives during the Thirty-Second Congress, in 1852. The bill, as usual, was Johnson's. l " Democrat John Dawson of Pennsylvania supported it with the broad argument that Congress could dispose of the public lands for any reason it liked8-an argument that Presidents Pierce and Buchanan would rightly reject in connection with asylums and colleges in the next few years. Thomas Averett of Virginia protested on grounds later to be invoked by Pierce and Buchanan: The purpose of the constitutional provision was to provide a source of revenue to discharge government obligations; Congress had no power to give away the public lands."' For those who agreed with Averett that Congress must receive something in return for its land, Joseph Chandler of Pennsylvania had an answer: There could be no better compensation for federal grants than settlement, and under the bill "no man shall come into possession of a single acre of the soil until he enters upon its occupation or improvement."' ' Standing alone, this argument was unconvincing. It was not enough to sustain the constitutionality of homestead grants that the Government got what it wanted in return. It would have got lunatic asylums and agricultural schools if grants for those purposes had been approved. What was crucial was whether what the government got was something it had constitutional power to promote. It was still essential to show that settlement and cultivation of the public domain were necessary and proper to the exercise of some federal power.
Indeed, several Representatives proceeded to show just that. Johnson began the demonstration, taking California as an example. California had been acquired under the treaty power. Why? "[F]or settlement and cultivation.'.'. Having acquired land in California, Congress was empowered to dispose of it-to promote the purposes for which it was acquired.
Is not the passage of a law to induce settlement and cultivation carrying out one of the highest objects contemplated by the Constitution in regard to the acquisition of territory? ...
[I]f the great object of the acquisition of territory is settlement and cultivation, to give power and potency to the country, is it not strange that, under that other provision of the Constitution "to dispose" of the territory, you cannot dispose of it to accomplish and carry out the very object for which you acquired it? 3 That the treaty power authorized the acquisition of territory had been accepted ever since the Senate approved the Louisiana treaty in 1803;" Johnson was right that it was not unreasonable to interpret Article IV to permit disposition of property for the purpose for which it had been acquired.
Other speakers applied the same argument to lands that had been ceded to the Federal Government by the states. "The very object for which the cessions were originally sought," quoth David Disney of Ohio, "was for the purpose of causing this territory to be settled, and formed into republican States. ' For what purpose has any Government upon the face of God's earth ever acquired territory? Was it not solely and exclusively for the purpose of peopling it? ... And, sir, we have recognized that this is the only purpose for which we have acquired this [territory], because, from time to time, we have passed laws with reference exclusively to its settlement. We have passed preemption laws to induce people to go and live upon the land. We have established a credit system at one time, and then we have established the cash system at another time,
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A splendid argument, n'est-ce pas? Opponents of various donations of public lands had argued, with considerable success, that the scope of Congress's power to dispose of property was defined by the purposes for which the land was acquired." As they had argued, those purposes included the raising of revenue to defray expenses incident to the execution of its other powers. But what the defenders of homesteads added to the debate was a recognition that this was not the only purpose for which territory had been acquired; another was to promote settlement and the erection of new states.
The Northwest Ordinance itself made this clear. The territory was to be divided into states; and there could be no states without inhabitants. Disposing of land to encourage settlement promoted the original purpose of admitting additional states. But the 1780 resolutions of the Continental Congress, paraphrased but not quoted by Representative Freeman, are even more directly in point.
On September 6, 1780 that Congress passed a resolution urging the several states to surrender their Western claims, as New York had already done, "for the general benefit," and to promote "the stability of the general confederacy."'"' A month later Congress enacted the clincher:
Resolved, that the unappropriated lands that may be ceded or relinquished to the United States, by any particular states, pursuant to the recommendation of Congress of the 6 day of September last, shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct republican states, which shall become members of the federal union... ;
That the said lands shall be granted and settled at such times and under such regulations as shall hereafter be agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled .... "'
It was in vain that Georgia's Alexander Stephens protested that neither the Virginia, the North Carolina, nor the Georgia cession exall the time selling the land at a comparatively low price .... with a view of encouraging people to go and live upon it. If we acquire these lands for the purpose of peopling them, I ask the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Averett] ... why Congress cannot, in the exercise of a sound discretion, pass a bill, the object of which is to settle the public lands? 186 See, for example, id at 1315 (Rep Howard). 187 Resolution (Sept 6,1780) at 806-07 (cited in note 25). The resolution also noted the necessity of strengthening the public credit-an oblique reference, perhaps, to the utility of land as a source of public funds. pressly mentioned settlement."9 As the states had unanimously agreed in Congress, settlement was one of the express purposes to which the land was to be applied; and this history informs the meaning of the corresponding later provision authorizing the new Congress to dispose of the public lands.
In short, Buchanan was right about agricultural colleges, but he was wrong about homesteads. For the two proposals were by no means as analogous as he believed they were; homesteads stood on a far firmer constitutional basis. '9°C ONCLUSION What do we learn from this little excursion into the musty recesses of mid-nineteenth-century congressional and executive materials? For some of us knowledge is its own justification. We read history, as others climb Mt. Everest, because it is there. Goethe made fun of the sycophantic Wagner, who gauchely announced that he wanted to know everything;' 9' I think he stated a fundamental tenet of the academic creed.
All right, some bits of knowledge are more interesting, or more useful, or more valuable than others. For those who care about the Constitution, it can never hurt to learn more about what people have thought it means. That is especially true when, as in the case of public lands, the provisions in question have largely disappeared from public view: The inquiring reader may actually learn something she didn't already know. It is even more true when the opinions one encounters are those of Presidents and members of Congress whose duty it was to construe the relevant provisions and whose interpretations actually determined what the Constitution would mean in practice.
You will notice that I cite no judicial decisions of the time respecting the questions discussed in this Article. That is because there weren't any. The original understanding of the property clause, like that of so many other constitutional provisions, was hammered out in the halls of Congress and in the President's House, not in the courts. Examination of the public-land controversies brings home to us once again the centrality of extrajudicial interpretation. [70:783 fare Clause had been copied from the Articles of Confederation, where it had plainly served only to identify the source of funds to cover expenditures elsewhere authorized, not to confer an independent power to spend; the Framers in Philadelphia substituted taxation for requisitions on the states but said nothing to indicate any intention to alter the incidental nature of federal spending.'9 ' Land revenues, in turn, were essentially regarded as an alternative to taxes. Homesteads, to be sure, could easily be supported on the ground that they served to promote settlement of the territories, which was a second explicit purpose of the acquisitions themselves. Grants to finance railroads and other infrastructural improvements serving the affected areas could plausibly be defended, as they were, as enhancing the value of the remaining corpus. Beyond this, however, Congress could not properly go. The lands had been acquired for federal purposes; they could not simply be given away to the states. Finally, there was no more justification for lavishing land revenues on such matters as agricultural education or care of the insane than for expending tax money for the same purpose; neither was necessary or proper to any legitimate exercise of federal authority.
The Supreme Court long ago rejected the interpretation I have just suggested. Nice distinctions respecting Congress's power to dispose of the public lands have long since been washed away. The question is no longer for what purposes Congress may disburse revenue from either land or taxes-anything of national as contrasted with local interest is now fair game -but rather what conditions it may attach to the grants it elects to make' 9 -a question dealt with only glancingly in the earlier debates considered in these pages. One of these days the authors of the modern counterrevolution against unlimited federal power will have to face the question whether it really is consistent with the new federalism to permit Congress to circumvent limitations on federal regulatory authority by the simple expedient of making the states offers they cannot rationally refuse. ' 9 Given the respect for precedent practiced by at least two members of the narrow current 194 The Constitution of the short-lived Confederate States of America, adopted in 1861, was correct in its translation of the General Welfare Clause, giving Congress power to lay and collect taxes "to pay the debts, provide for the common defense, and carry on the Government of the 195 See Butler, 297 US at 53-56,77-78 (disallowing the condition that farmers reduce their output); South Dakota v Dole, 483 US at 205 (upholding the condition of raising the state drinking age). 196 Compare United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 551-52, 567-68 (1995) (holding Congress without authority to forbid the possession of guns in or near schools), with South Dakota v Dole, 483 US at 205, 211-12 (upholding a grant for highway construction on condition that the drinking age be raised).
[70:783 majority, however," the Court seems most unlikely to go back to Mr. Madison's original conception of the proper subjects of federal largesse.
The historical record nevertheless stands as a yardstick against which to measure the Court's performance, in terms not only of the question of congressional authority but also of the interpretive methodology by which it should be resolved. For another lesson of the materials we have examined is that virtually everyone who participated in the discussion assumed that the meaning of the contested provisions should be determined on the basis of their text, their history, and their purpose. There is nothing very remarkable in that, except that so many legal scholars appear to have different assumptions today. Blackstone had said it in his widely accepted treatise, and both Marshall and Story had repeated it for the Supreme Court: Written laws should be so interpreted, consistently with their language, as to achieve the ends for whose effectuation they were adopted."'
It was this understanding that underlay the bulk of the arguments made in the antebellum debates over disposition of the public lands. Proponents of unencumbered congressional authority relied on the unrestricted language of the constitutional provision; advocates of limited authority relied upon historical evidence that land revenues were meant to be a substitute for taxes; supporters of homestead legislation pointed to the additional purpose of promoting settlement. Thus the public-land debates confirm once again, as I have said elsewhere, that in the early days just about everybody was what is now called an originalist in constitutional interpretation.'" What that tells us about the proper approach to interpretation today is itself a question worth debating; if studies such as the present one help to stimulate that discussion, I shall be pleased.
Finally, like other studies of constitutional history, the publiclands controversy deepens our acquaintance with a number of fascinating political actors and introduces us to others whom we may not have known at all. Great names like Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun figure in our story, as they so often did during the forty years in which, together with Daniel Webster, they collectively dominated the deliberations of Congress. Behind his misty pedestal as the personification of democracy and martial valor we begin to get a glimpse into Andrew Jackson's mind, and we are afforded a new perspective on that dogged champion of popular sovereignty, Stephen A. dimly remembered played equally prominent roles and begin to take meaningful shape in the course of our reading: George Badger, Lewis Cass, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Andrew Johnson. Some of the choicest lines, indeed, were spoken by some of the most obscure players: Andrew Butler, William King, George Pugh, David Disney, John Freeman. The wide dispersion of responsibility for extrajudicial interpretation reflected in these pages brings home to us some of the advantages of collective deliberation. Constitutional interpretation was not the exclusive province of superstars like Clay, Webster, and Calhoun; the whole was truly more than the sum of its parts.
If in addition, despite intervening developments in construction of the relevant provisions, others should find in the materials here considered lessons of substantive relevance to modern constitutional controversies, so much the better; I am happy to bequeath my findings to anyone who may find them useful.
